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Since ancient Greece, handshaking has been commonly practiced between two people as a friendly gesture to express trust
and respect, or form a mutual agreement. In this paper, we show that such physical contact can be used to bootstrap secure
cyber contact between the smart devices worn by users. The key observation is that during handshaking, although belonged
to two different users, the two hands involved in the shaking events are often rigidly connected, and therefore exhibit very
similar motion patterns. We propose a novel key generation system, which harvests motion data during user handshaking
from the wrist worn smart devices such as smartwatches or fitness bands, and exploits the matching motion patterns to
generate symmetric keys on both parties. The generated keys can be then used to establish a secure communication channel
for exchanging data between devices. This provides a much more natural and user-friendly alternative for many applications,
e.g., exchanging/sharing contact details, friending on social networks, or even making payments, since it doesn’t involve
extra bespoke hardware, nor require the users to perform pre-defined gestures. We implement the proposed key generation
system on off-the-shelf smartwatches, and extensive evaluation shows that it can reliably generate 128-bit symmetric keys just
after around 1s of handshaking (with success rate >99%), and is resilient to different types of attacks including impersonate
mimicking attacks, impersonate passive attacks or eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, for real-time impersonate mimicking
attacks: in our experiments, the Equal Error Rate (EER) is only 1.6% on average. We also show that the proposed key generation
system can be extremely lightweight, and is able to run in-situ on the resource-constrained smartwatches without incurring
excessive resource consumption.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wrist worn smart devices such as smartwatches and fitness bands are becoming ubiquitous: according to the
latest global forecast [18] their market is set to triple its volume in the near future, reaching $32.9 billion by
2020. Instead of remaining as the companion devices of smartphones, now they are more independent, and
capable of offering full-fledged functionalities. For instance, the recently announced Apple Watch Series 3 has
the same level of connectivity including 4G LTE with smartphones, and can perform all kinds of tasks such as
messaging, receiving/making calls, or streaming music without presence of the paired phone [16]. Comparing
to smartphones, those wrist worn wearables are often rigidly attached to the users’ body, and equipped with
rich sensing modalities, which makes them the ideal pervasive platform to sense and interact with the internal
and external user states. In the near future they will become the key element in the cyber-physical ecosystem,
enabling the next generation applications in a broad spectrum of sectors such as intelligent mobility, smart spaces,
and digital healthcare [13, 17, 23, 24, 32].
In this paper, we leverage the unique advantages offered by wrist worn smart devices, and explore the feasibility
of using handshakes, a common form of physical contact between human beings, to enable secure data exchange
between their devices(Fig. 1). The intuition is that in many circumstances, we often shake hands and then
exchange physical or digital tokens in order to connect with the others. For example when meeting with someone
for the first time, as a proper etiquette we typically shake hands with each other, and then exchange business
cards, save contact details on our phones, or even friend each other on social networks. Essentially in those
cases, handshakes can be viewed as the trigger for the subsequent data exchange activities, i.e., by shaking hands,
both parties establish mutual consent to share information in physical or cyber world. Therefore, we aim to
integrate the process of exchanging private information with the actual handshakes, so that when two users are
shaking hands, their smartwatches or fitness bands can automatically communicate to each other and exchange
data on-the-fly. We envision that in the future, users may have the option to configure their smartwatches or
fitness bands to ‘socially discoverable’ during handshakes, in the same way as the current wireless file sharing
mechanisms such as the Apple AirDrop [29].
Fig. 1. The motion pattern induced by handshaking between two users can be captured by each of their wrist worn smart
wearables (e.g., a smartwatch and a fitness band as shown in this figure), and used to generate cryptographic keys for secure
data exchange, e.g., sharing contact details or friending on social networks.
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Although this vision is appealing, there are several challenges need to be tackled. Firstly, the wireless commu-
nication channels established for data exchange have to be secured, since information such as contact details
is sensitive, and wireless communications are often prune to impersonate attacks and eavesdropping attacks.
Secondly, the data exchange process should requireminial extra effort from the users, i.e., they only need to shake
hands normally without extra intervention such as pairing in prior or entering the same PINs. Finally, the system
should be efficient and lightweight enough to run in-situ on the resource-constrained smartwatches or fitness
bands, but not to quickly drain the device battery.
Unfortunately, there is no existing solution can address all three challenges at the same time. For instance, some
existing products and patents [15, 22] can detect handshakes or high fives to exchange data such as social media
info, but they either broadcast over open wireless channels which can be easily intercepted [15], or rely on the
cloud to verify keys [22], which won’t work without Internet connectivity and may incur undesirable delays. On
the other hand, using key distribution protocols such as Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange [7] requires public
key management infrastructure, which is computationally intensive and not feasible for real-time execution on
wearables. The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology enables secure data communication between smart
devices in the vicinity (normally within 20cm). However, for now the security of NFC on smart wearables is
largely guaranteed by the paired smartphones, such as passcodes or fingerprint authentication. As wearables can
work independently of phone usage, the private data held by NFC can be vulnerable without the extra layer of
protection.
To overcome the shortcomings of existing approaches, we propose the design and implementation of a novel
key generation system that directly uses handshakes to encrypt data exchange between wrist worn smart devices.
It exploits the fact that within an episode of handshaking, the two hands holding together should produce similar
movements, which can be picked up by sensors (e.g., accelerometers) of smartwatches or fitness bands worn on
the corresponding wrists of both users. With the captured motion signals, the proposed key generation system
generates symmetric cryptographic keys on both sides, which are used to secure subsequent data exchange
between the two devices. We proposed and published the original key generation system on IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (Percom), 2018 [25]. While, in this journal version,
we considered new practical threats when using our system, which includes passive impersonate attacks and
mimicking eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, in the extended work, we provide significantly more comprehensive
evaluations on the robustness of the system when the users are using different models of smart watches. We also
evaluate the performance of the key generation system under the three types of the attacks compared with the
original publication. At last we include new evaluation metrics, e.g., generated key entropy, to justify the quality
of the keys.
Concretely, the technical contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel key generation system for secure data exchange between wrist worn smart wearable
devices via handshakes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that explicitly uses physical
contact (i.e., handshakes) to secure cyber contact (i.e., data exchange between smart devices) in a natural
and user-friendly way.
• We implement the key generation system on off-the-shelf smartwatches, and propose a set of efficient
algorithms which capture and process the motion signals of handshaking events, and generate symmetric
keys in a distributed fashion to encrypt/decrypt data exchange. Our system is lightweight and can be
always-on: it runs in real-time on the resource-constrained smart wearables and incurs marginal overhead.
• We evaluate the key generation system extensively on datasets collected from real-world settings. The
results show that it is able to generate keys of over 140 bits within 2s of handshaking, and the average
key agreement rate between two legitimate devices are close to 100%. We also show that the proposed key
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generation system is resilient to run-time impersonate and eavesdropping attacks, where the Equal Error
Rate (EER) for attackers mimicking the pattern of legitimate users is only 1.6%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 discusses the application scenarios of the proposed key
generation system, and describes the threat model. Sec. 3 presents the overview of the system, and Sec. 4 explains
the details of the proposed approach that enables secure data exchange via handshakes. The proposed system is
evaluated in Sec. 5, and related work is covered in Sec. 6. We conclude the paper in Sec. 7 and discuss potential
future directions.
2 APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND THREAT MODEL
2.1 Application Scenarios
Motivation: In this paper, we aim to design a key generation algorithm for smart watches to enable secured
Cyber-social interactions, such as friending on social networks (facebook, twitter, instagram, etc), bill splitting
or money transfer via digital wallets (e.g., Alipay), are now pervasively incorporated in our common social
life everyday. Considering the hardware specification and common use case of smart watches, the algorithm
should be lightweight, secure and requires no further infrastructure. As far as we know, there are no existing
solutions satisfying all the design factors. Specifically, the key distribution protocols such as Diffie-Hellman (D-H),
are computationally intensive and it also requires public key management infrastructure to authenticate the
identity, otherwise is vulnerable to impersonate attacks [31]. NFC is a potential key exchange solution for smart
watches and its short-range communication guarantees the security and authenticity. However, successful NFC
communication requires at least one of the two smart watches working in active mode. According to our careful
investigation on the specifications of smart watches available on the market, only very few models support
NFC active mode in hardware level such as Sony Smartwatch. But, even if Sony Smartwatch is used, specific
knowledge is required to enable NFC active mode as it is not supported by Android OS. Therefore, NFC is not a
convenient choice at current stage.
Our Solution: According to above design factors, we propose a key generation system providing a natural and
reliable way to secure data exchange between wrist worn smart devices when shaking hands. It uses the motion
signals induced by handshaking to simultaneously generating symmetric keys across different devices, and use the
keys to establish secure communication channels. In fact, the generated keys can also be used to encrypt wireless
communications between other mobile devices of the users, such as phones, laptops or even smart vehicles,
as long as they remain paired or authenticated with the users’ smartwatches or fitness bands. Therefore, the
capability offered by the proposed key generation system can be orthogonal to devices types or communication
modalities, and is a fundamental building block for many application scenarios. As our evaluations in Section 5,
our proposed key generation system is lightweight, secure and requires no extra infrastructure. It only depends on
acceleration data which can be easily collected from most of current commercialized smart watches. In practice,
it can be implemented as an OS level service, which empowers different apps to exchange information securely
with other users’ devices, such as friending on social networks (e.g., Facebook, Wechat) or money transfer via
digital wallets (e.g., Alipay). In the following, we discuss two example applications of the proposed key generation
system.
Friending upon Greeting: In many social events, connecting on social networks has become the convention
after greeting with each other. With the proposed system, this process can be seamlessly done as two users
shake hands, where they don’t have to keep business cards or add each other manually on WeChat/WhatsApp.
Concretely, during handshaking a token containing the temporary authentication to connect the account details
or friend request/confirmation will be encrypted at one of the two devices with the key generated by the proposed
system, and transmitted through wireless channels. Then the other device uses the symmetric key to decrypt
the data to obtain the token to perform further actions such as updating the friending status accordingly. At
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last, temporary authentication contained in the token is deactivated after use to prevent offline attacks, such as
through video recordings or exhaustive search.
Money Transfer via Digital Wallet: The proposed system can also be used to enable secure bill splitting or
money transfer between users’ smart watches. For instance, imagine Alice and Bob have lunch at a restaurant
where splitting bills are not allowed. Alice would like transfer money to Bob through digital wallet apps on their
smart watches. By simply shaking hands, her digital wallet uses the generated key to secure a wireless channel
and transmits a temporary token instantly. On Bob’s side, his wallet app may use the symmetric key obtained
from his smartwatch to decrypt and obtain the token. Then his wallet app can use this token to request money
from Alice’s account. During this whole process, both of them do not need even take their phone out.
2.2 Thread Model
The proposed system is designed to address impersonation attacks [10] and eavesdropping attacks [27] which are
common security issues when transmitting data over wireless medium. In this paper we assume the adversary
has full knowledge of the system details, and is able to sniff all the wireless traffic. However, we assume the
legitimate devices have not been compromised, and it is impossible for the adversary to obtain the on-board
motion data.
Impersonate Attacks: In such attacks, an adversary impersonates to be legitimate in a communication protocol
to extract private information exchanged by the legitimate devices. When he observes two legitimate users trying
to build secured communication through handshakes, he follows their handshakes and uses the messages created
by his own handshake movement to fool one of the two legitimate users to build “secured” communication
channel with him. In this paper, we consider two types of impersonate attacks:mimicking attacks are to mimic
the very handshake movements between legitimate users wearing smartwatches or fitness bands, by himself
or with another adversary. The recorded motion data is then used to generate the same cryptographic key and
attack the encrypted message. While in passive attacks, the adversary is unable to observe the handshakes
between legitimate users clearly so he shakes hands freely.
Eavesdropping Attacks: In eavesdropping attacks, the adversary only eavesdrops the messages exchanged
between the two legitimate users without trying to impersonate into the data sharing protocol. We consider
the adversary as an active copycat, who observes and eavesdrops the data exchange activities among nearby
legitimate users. He mimics the handshakes of the legitimate users and try to generate the same encryption key
according to the reconciliation messages (see Section 4.3 for details) exchanged between the legitimate users.
Once the adversary generates the same key as the legitimate users. He can easily extract the sensitive information
from the encrypted messages
It is also worth pointing out that, in some cases the adversary may be able to record the handshakes using video
cameras and infer the keys via sophisticated image processing and pattern recognition methods. The adversary
may even try exhaustive search to decode the cached encrypted messages. However, the exchanged data is merely
short-lived tokens, which would already expire before the adversary could decode the messages. Undertaking
real-time video attacks is possible, but in practice the cost of launching such sophisticated attacks is much higher
and the success rate is questionable.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed key generation system. We consider the example of
automatic friending on social networks as discussed in Sec. 2.1, and show how the proposed key generation
works in practice. Fig. 2 demonstrates the workflow of the system in this scenario.
Handshake Motion Detection: As two users start to shake hands, the key generation system captures the
motion signals with the on-board Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs), which have been embedded in most of the
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Fig. 2. The workflow of the proposed key generation system in the friending upon greeting scenario as discussed in Sec.2.1
current smart wearables. When significant motion is detected, a lightweight SVM-based classifier is applied on a
short period of raw sensor data to determine if the handshake happens. If yes, a segment of acceleration data
following the detected starting point is aligned and preprocessed, which is then used for the next step of key
generation.
Key Generation & Reconciliation: With the preprocessed motion data, the key generation system firstly
applies dimensionality reduction techniques to recover the dominant signal components. The extracted signals
are then quantified and converted into bits by thresholding. Due to the noisy nature of motion signals, the system
also incorporates a key reconciliation step with the other user’s device, to discard the ambiguous bits and only
keep the reliable ones to generate symmetric keys.
Wireless Channel Configuration: When a handshaking event is detected, the key generation system enables
wireless radios on the smart wearables. As discussed in the previous section, the system is communication
modality neutral: it relies on the underlying network service to discover nearby devices, and tries to establish a
wireless communication channel with the correct peer (i.e., the one party involved in this handshaking event)
using the generated keys.
Secure Data Exchange: Once appropriate wireless communication channel is established, the proposed system
uses the symmetric keys on both devices to secure data exchange between them. Concretely, we consider the
standard messages encryption and decryption techniques, where the sender and receiver encrypts/decrypts
the messages with their local keys respectively. In this way, although the wireless medium can be sniffed, the
adversary won’t be able to decode the intercepted data without the correct keys.
Now we are in a position to explain the details of the proposed secure data exchange approach.
4 SECURE DATA EXCHANGE VIA HANDSHAKES
In this section, we discuss the key components of the proposed key generation system which enable secure data
exchange via handshakes. We start with how to detect and capture motion data during handshaking in Sec. 4.1,
and then describe our algorithms to generate and reconcile keys in Sec. 4.2 and Sec. 4.3 respectively. Then in
Sec. 4.4 we show how to establish the correct wireless channel, and finally Sec. 4.5 discusses the process of data
encryption & decryption in the proposed key generation system.
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4.1 Handshake Motion Detection
In this paper, we assume that both users involved in a handshaking event wear smart devices such as smartwatches
or fitness bands, on the wrists of their dominant hands, i.e. the hands that are used during the handshakes. In this
case, the motion of the handshakes can be recorded by the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensors, which are
embedded in most of the current off-the-shelf smart wearables. Typically, they contain a 3-axes accelerometer,
and optionally gyroscope and magnetometer. In our system, we only use accelerometers since they are the
most pervasive and very efficient, while gyroscope consumes significantly more energy. Our experiments show
that, with sensor readings just from the accelerometers, the proposed system is able to generate robust enough
cryptographic keys.
Fig. 3 shows an example of the accelerometer sensor readings over three axes during a handshaking event (top
three plots), where we can see that the handshake induces periodic patterns in the signal. On the other hand,
the bottom plot of Fig. 3 shows the squared magnitude of acceleration, which is computed by combining the
squared data values of signals from all three axes. Clearly, the acceleration magnitude is very significant with
respect to the background noise, and we see several peaks corresponding to the up and down movement during
handshaking. Therefore, our system detects the first signal peak in a handshake event, and uses it as the anchor
point to align the sensor readings for the next step of key generation.
However, it is possible that other common motions may also cause significant peaks in the magnitude of
the accelerations. Therefore, an activity recognition component is needed in our system to avoid false alarms.
Activities or gesture recognition has been well-studied in the literature [33, 34, 34] and some of them become
build-in functionalities of smartwatch OS, such as walking/step detection, raising hand detection, etc. To recognize
handshakes, we build a SVM-based classifier running in-situ on smart watches which is designed and implemented
in our previous work [12]. We considered four different types of activities which may happen when the people
are using our system: walking, hand-raising, hand-waves and handshaking. According to our evaluation on
collected dataset, the overall recognition accuracy is over 97% and the runtime of the classifier on smart watches
is less than 9ms .
4.2 Key Generation
Signal Feature Extraction: As shown in Fig. 3, the raw acceleration signal has three axes, representing motion
with respect to the body reference frame of the device. In practice, the devices can be attached to the wrists of
the users in arbitrary ways, to reliably generate symmetric keys across different devices, we need to transform
the signal to reveal the dominant motion patters that are invariant to device attachment. On the other hand,
although the acceleration magnitude is robust to different device posture, as shown later in Sec. 5.2 it contains
much less information and thus impossible to generate high quality keys (i.e., in terms of bit rate). Therefore
in this paper, we consider a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based approach, which converts the 3-axes
acceleration into signals representing the dominant motion components.
Let us assume two users, Alice and Bob, have shaken hands with each other, and the motion data has been
captured by both of their smart wearables. Suppose Alice obtains a data matrix X ∈ RM×N containing the
accelerometer readings, whereM is the number of axes and N is the number of data points from each axis. PCA
finds a matrixU ∈ Rm×M which projects the original data into a smaller subspace while retaining most of the
information. Before computing the matrix U , the data matrix should be firstly centered., i.e., the mean value of
each column in data matrix X is subtracted:
XC = X − 1
m
M∑
i=1
Xi (1)
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Fig. 3. The acceleration readings along three axis during 3s of a handshaking event (top three plots), and the squared
acceleration magnitude (the bottom plot).
where Xi is the ith row of X . After the data matrix is centered, the Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors matrices can be
obtained by conducting EigenValue Decomposition (EVD) as,
{U ,Eordered ,VT } = EVD(XCXTC ) (2)
Eordered contains the Eigenvalues on its diagonal, which are sorted in descending order according to their absolute
values.U contains the corresponding Eigenvectors by columns. Then we project the original data matrix into the
subspace defined by theU :
Y = UTX (3)
where Y ∈ Rm×N . It is well known that the first principal component contains the largest part of information
in the original signal. It corresponds to the largest Eigenvalue in Eordered , and the first row of the matrix Y .
Therefore, we use the first row of Y (denoted as Y 1) to represent the dominant motion signal features. Fig 4 shows
an example of the computed features for both Alice and Bob. We see that although generated on different devices,
they exhibit similar patterns and agree to each other very well. This confirms that it is clearly possible to use
such features to generate symmetric keys across two different devices.
Signal Quantization: Now we need to convert the continuous motion signal features into discrete keys. Our
system uses a similar signal quantization and bit extraction methods as in [8] and [20], which quantify continuous
signals into bit codes. As shown in Figure 5, the idea is to firstly divide the time-varying continuous signals
into small segments with the same length. e.g., 10 data points as in our experiments. Then for each segment, we
compute its upper (q+) and lower (q−) quantization thresholds as:
q+ = µ + Kσ
q− = µ − Kσ (4)
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Fig. 5. Illustration of quantization process we use to generate bits stream, figure was first presented in our previous work [31]
where µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation of the values of the data points within the segment. K is the
quantization factor, which directly controls the values of the upper and lower thresholds. The thresholds, then,
have significant impact on the performance of the key generation system via changing the bit generation rate
and key agreement rate (we will discuss this with more details in Sec. 5.2).
In practice, those thresholds are used to determine the bit values at each position of the generated key.
Specifically, a data point over δ+ will be encoded as 1, while the one below δ− will be 0. Any data points between
the thresholds will be discarded to improve stability. After this quantization step, now Alice and Bob have their
own keys locally at their devices. Without loss of generality, in the following we denote the keys as KAlice and
KBob .
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4.3 Key Reconciliation
Theoretically, the generated keys can be used to encrypt and decrypt the messages if and only if they agree with
each other, i.e., KAlice = KBob . However in practice, the keys generated from the above process may not be able
to precisely agree with each other due to signal noise. In most cases, we would obtain two keys KAlice and KBob ,
where KAlice ≈ KBob . The disagreement often happens if the value of a data point is close to the thresholds, i.e.,
in the presence of small turbulence caused by motion noise, a bit at Alice’s side might be discarded since the
value is below the upper threshold δ+, while remained ‘1’ at Bob’s side.
To address this problem, we consider a key reconciliation approach [6, 30, 30] to discard those ambiguous bits.
The idea is to exchange the index of the valid bit positions to the other devices, and reach a mutual agreement
on which bits should be used in the final keys. For instance, assume the key generated by Alice’s devices is
[1x0xx11x00], while for Bob is [1x00x11xx0], here x means the position where no valid bit is present. Then both
Alice and Bob inform each other the positions of the valid bits, i.e., Alice sends PAlice = {1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10}, and Bob
sends PBob = {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10}. Upon receiving the positions, they compare the received vector with the local one,
and agree that only the bits that are valid according to both vectors should be used. In this example, the agreed
positions should be {1, 3, 6, 7, 10} so that the final symmetric keys are KAlice = KBob = [10110].
Note that during reconciliation, only the indices of the generated bits (either 1 or 0) are exchanged but the true
values of the keys are not disclosed to anyone (legal or illegal) overhearing the reconciliation. At this stage, it is
possible that the two users haven’t established a communication channel with each other. They just broadcast
and receive the position vectors of valid bits to/from the nearby devices. For instance, there may be two pairs of
users using the proposed key generation system in a close proximity, and in the following we explain how the
system uses the received information to establish a secure wireless channel with the correct peer.
4.4 Wireless Channel Configuration
As discussed above, in the presence of multiple pairs of the system users, we need to correctly set up communica-
tion channels between the right peers, i.e., the two who are shaking each other’s hands. One naive approach is to
look at the received signal strengths (RSS), and choose the device with the strongest RSS to connect. However
this is not robust enough in practice since RSS measurements are inherently noisy. The proposed key generation
system considers a probe-based approach. For instance, Alice might receive more than one position vectors
P from different devices, including Bob’s. Then it performs the above reconciliation step for each vector, and
generates a list of candidate keys. Those candidate keys are then used to encrypt a pre-defined probe message
whose content is known by everyone, and the encrypted messages (one for each candidate key) are replied back
to the corresponding senders.
On the other hand, When Bob receives those probe messages, it tries to use the list of candidate keys to decrypt
the messages accordingly. It should be that just one message can be successfully decrypted, which is the one sent
by Alice. Now Bob only needs to keep the candidate key from Alice, and reply an acknowledgment message to
Alice, indicating that he is ready for further data exchange. In this way, the proposed key generation system
establishes a wireless communication channel between Alice and Bob who is shaking hands with each other, and
identifies the correct keys for future data encryption and decryption.
Note that besides the two wearables that have generated the keys (i.e., the smartwatches or fitness bands worn
by the users), such a communication channel could also be established between other devices (e.g., phones or
laptops) belonging to the users, as long as they are paired or connected with those wearables in the same private
(often ad hoc) network. This is straightforward since the wearables can simply share the generated keys with
the other devices within the network, allowing those devices to directly perform the above probe process, and
initialize data exchange with each other.
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4.5 Secure Data Exchange
Given the symmetric keys and configured wireless communication channel, the proposed key generation systems
on Alice and Bob apply the standard encryption and decryption methods using the keys generated distributedly
to guarantee the confidentiality of the data exchange. The keys locally generated at both sides are very likely to
be identical from the same handshaking motion so that the symmetric key encryption system can be achieved. In
our implementation, we require the generated keys to contain at least 140 valid bits to ensure the level of security,
and if unsuccessful the system will ask the users to do another handshake. Then we consider a fixed length of the
first 128 bits to encrypt and decrypt messages at both sides.
Depending on different application scenarios, in some cases such as automatic friending on social networks, the
data exchanged is merely digital tokens, i.e., friend requests/confirmations. Therefore after successful completion
of the data exchange, the proposed system will also inform the social networks about this transaction via their
APIs, to update the friending status accordingly.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Experiment Setup
5.1.1 System Implementation: We implement the key generation system on off-the-shelf smartwatches,
which can run in real-time. In our experiments, we use Samsung Gear Live, which has a Quad-core 1.4GHz CPU,
512M RAM, and 300mAh battery, and run Android Wear OS. We set the accelerometer sampling rate to 200Hz,
and uses the Bluetooth 4.0+ InsecureRfcomm to establish wireless communication channels.
5.1.2 Data Collection. We recruited 20 volunteers to participate in our experiments, containing 10 males and
10 females with age ranging from 22 to 54. During each experiment session, we asked all participants to wear
smartwatches on their right wrists, and randomly divided the 20 participants into five groups, each containing
four people. Within each group, two of the participants were selected to be the legitimate users while the other
two were the adversaries. We used Samsung Gear Live for the above data collection. To show the robustness
of our system on different devices, we also collected one dataset from the users wearing different devices. 10
subjects participated in collecting this dataset. During each data collection session one subject was wearing Sony
Smartwatch while the other subject was wearing Samsung Gear Live.
Impersonate Mimicking Attack:When collecting dataset associate with impersonate attack, the legitimate
users were asked to shake hands to exchange data, while at the same time the adversaries observed this and
also shake hands with each other, trying to mimic the pattern of the handshake as much as they can. Then the
adversary device will try to build “secured” communication channel with one of the legitimate users through
reconciliation.
Impersonate Passive Attack: The protocol is similar to impersonate attack; the only difference is the adversaries
will not mimic the handshakes of the handshakes.
Eavesdrop Attack: The data collection procedure is the same to the impersonate mimicking attack. But, the
adversary device eavesdrops the reconciliationmessages exchanged between the legitimate devices and determines
the valid bits positions according to the eavesdropped messages. At the same time the adversary will try mimic
the pattern of the legitimate users to generate the same encryption key to disclose the information from the
following messages shared between the two legitimate devices.
We conduced over 1, 000 sessions of experiments for each type of attacks, and have collected six datasets:
three containing motion data from the legitimate users, while the other three consist of the data from the
corresponding attacks. In the following unless otherwise stated, we refer to those two datasets as the legitimate
dataset, impersonate mimicking dataset, impersonate passive dataset and eavesdropping dataset.
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5.1.3 Evaluation Metrics: In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the proposed key generation system
with respect to the following metrics. Generated Bit Rate is the number of bits generated from the sensor readings
per second. Bit Agreement Rate denotes the percentage of the matching bits of the two cryptographic keys
generated by two devices during a handshaking event. Generated Keys Entropy is the entropy of the generated
keys which measures the uncertainty; higher entropy means higher randomness of the key and better privacy
which has been used to estimate the quality of the keys generated by physical motions [30]. Signals Coherence is
the empirical CDF of the coherence of different motion signal features. Key Success rate is the percentage that
the two keys generated via handshakes are identical. False Acceptance Rate (FAR) is a measure of the probability
that a mimicking adversary generates an identical key to that of a legitimate device. False Rejection Rate (FRR) is
defined as the ratio of the failed matching attempts via handshakes. It is obvious there is a trade-off between
FAR and FRR. Equal Error Rate (EER) measures the trade-off between FAR and FRR and it is the value of FAR or
FRR when the two false rates are equal. We also evaluate the system overhead of the system by profiling the
Computation Time and Energy Consumption of its key components on off-the-shelf smartwatches.
5.2 Experiment Results
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Fig. 6. The bit rate of keys under different quantization factor K , generated by the proposed PCA-based approach (the red
line) and the baseline approach using acceleration magnitude (the blue line).
5.2.1 Bit Rate vs. Signal Feature Extraction: The first experiment studies the impact of signal feature
extraction approaches in terms of the generated bit rate. Fig. 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of the
generated bit rates of the proposed PCA based approach with respect to the baseline method of using acceleration
magnitude. First we see that the proposed approach produces significantly higher bit rate than using acceleration
magnitude. For example, when K = 0.7, the average generated bit rate from our approach is about 120 bit/sec,
which almost triples that of the acceleration magnitude based. In addition, we also see that as quantization
factor goes up, the generated bit rate drops for both approaches. This is expected since high quantization factor
means bigger thresholds, where the bits generation process is more prune to noise. However, the PCA based
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approach degrades much more gracefully than the baseline, especially in the range of [0.4, 0.8]. This is because
our approach can recover the most dominant motion patterns from the raw signal, and thus is inherently more
robust to high quantization factors.
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Fig. 7. The impact of key reconciliation on (a) bit rate, and (b) bit agreement rate of the generated keys.
This experiment verifies the impact of the proposed key reconciliation method as discussed in Sec. 4.3 and
robustness of the key generation algorithm when the two users using different devices. We consider both
the generated bit rate and bit agreement rate as the metrics. As shown in Fig. 7(a), we see that on one hand,
reconciliation slightly reduces the generated bit rate, since it discards those ambiguous bits. However, this has a
positive knock-on effect on the bit agreement rate. As shown in Fig. 7(b), the bit agreement rate is significantly
higher when key reconciliation is considered. In practice, for a reasonable K , we would prefer the high bit
agreement rate introduced by reconciliation, since the generated keys are only valid if they are identical in every
bit: if an agreement can’t be reached, the users would have to shake hands again to regenerate the keys. In
addition, the gap between with and without reconciliation in Fig. 7(a) is only marginal especially when K < 0.4
and K > 0.7. At last, the results from “different devices” (two users are using different devices) are almost the
same to the benchmark: generated bit rate only decreases a bit while the bits agreement rate achieves almost the
same results. Therefore, we can claim that the users are not required to wear the same devices.
5.2.2 Entropy of Generated Keys. This experiment evaluates the quality of the generated keys in the sense of
key randomness. Keys with higher randomness is more difficult to be hacked than those with lower randomness.
To evaluate the randomness of the keys, we compute the entropy of the generated keys with different settings,
i.e., the one utilizes all the proposed components in the system; the one applies all but reconciliation; and the one
applies acceleration magnitude instead of PCA. The entropy is computed as the following equation:
S = −
∑
i
p(Ki )loд2p(Ki ) (5)
As shown in Figure 8, we can see that, compared with the approach without reconciliation, the proposed key
generation system produces almost equivalent performance on entropy, but only slightly drops when K > 0.9. It
is reasonable as reconciliation discards some bits which may reduce the randomness (or entropy). Meanwhile,
we can observe that, compared with acceleration magnitude, PCA improves the entropy of the generated keys
significantly. To prevent the system from using weak keys, we require the entropy of the generated key must be
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Fig. 8. Entropy of generated keys with different settings
over a threshold (we use 0.9 in our system). The generated key will be checked if its entropy is over the threshold,
otherwise, the key will be discarded.
5.2.3 Security Analysis on Impersonate Attacks . We first evaluate the performance of the system under
impersonate attacks including (impersonate) mimicking attacks and passive attacks. We use both the legitimate
and the two adversary datasets (impersonate mimicking dataset and impersonate passive dataset) and vary the
quantization factor K . The following three metrics, generated bit rate, bit agreement rate and key success rate are
considered in the experiments.
Generated Bits Rate v.s. K: Fig. 9(a) shows how the generated bit rate varies over K on all datasets. We see
that generally a smaller K produces higher bit rate, and handshakes made by legitimate users (i.e., from the
legitimate dataset) achieve higher bit rate than that of the adversaries. This is because legitimate handshakes
tend to produce very similar motion signals across two devices, and thus only fewer bits in the generated keys
will be thrown away during the key reconciliation step.
BitAgreementRate v.s. K:On the other hand, for bit agreement rate, as shown in Fig. 9(b), legitimate handshakes
have slightly higher bit agreement rate as K goes up. However, for the handshakes produced by adversaries, the
bit agreement rate first go slightly up and then dropped, and the variances becomes much bigger. Note that the
average bit agreement rate from legitimate handshakes achieve almost 100% when K is larger than 0.7. More
importantly, we see that the gap between legitimate and adversarial handshakes is very significant for all K . This
implies that legitimate handshakes are very hard to be mimicked in real-time, since it is very difficult for the
adversaries to reliably generate high quality keys. Besides, comparing different types of attacks the adversaries
mimicking the handshakes tend to produce slightly higher agreement rate than those conducting the attacks
freely; however, the rate is still significantly lower than the legitimate handshakes.
Success Rate v.s. K: Finally, we evaluate how key success rate on legitimate dataset, i.e., the generated two
keys are identical, varies with respect to the quantization factor K . As shown in Fig. 10, the key success rate
increases as K , which reaches 100% when K is larger than 0.7. Therefore, in our case a larger quantization factor
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Fig. 9. The impact of different quantization factor (K ) on the system performance in terms of (a) bit rate, (b) bit agreement
rate
K results in higher bit agreement rate and key success rate, but has a negative impact on the bit rate. In addition,
we observe that the bit rate and bit agreement rate of legitimate handshakes are consistently higher than that of
the adversarial, which means we could reject the adversarial attempts with appropriate thresholds. Particularly
in the current key generation system, we use bit rate threshold to decide if the generated key should be accepted
as valid.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Quantization Factor(K)
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
at
ch
in
g 
Su
cc
es
s 
Ra
te
(%
)
Legitimate Handshake
Fig. 10. Key matching success rate under various quantization factor value (K).
Resilience to Impersonate Attacks: In this experiment we evaluate the performance of the proposed key
generation system under mimicking and passive attacks. We assume that as two legitimate users are shaking
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hands, there are different types of adversaries who can sniff the wireless media, and mimic the handshaking
patterns (mimicking adversary) or conduct their own handshakes freely (passive adversary) in real-time, trying
to produce the same cryptographic key. For the handshaking events, we first analyze the coherence between: a)
signals produced by two legitimate devices, b) signals produced by one legitimate device and the adversarial
device which was imitating that handshake and c) signals produced by one legitimate device and the passive
adversary’s device. Fig. 11 shows the empirical CDFs of signal coherence for the three cases. We see that the
legitimate handshakes consistently produce much coherent signals: around 97% of the signals have coherence
values over 0.9, while for mimicking adversary around 97% is under 0.8 and for passive adversary the results are
even worse. This confirms that: a) during handshaking the two legitimate devices tend to induce very similar
motion signals; and b) it is difficult to produce similar key in real-time without holding hands together event if
the adversary is able to mimic the patterns of the handshakes close by.
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Fig. 11. The CDF of signal coherence between two signals generated by legitimate handshakes (red), by an adversary
mimicking the legitimate handshakes (blue) and by an adversary shaking hands freely (black).
Based on the above observations, now we evaluate the performance of the proposed system when facing
mimicking attacks and passive attacks using metrics False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and
Equal Error Rate (EER). Generally, we would like to reduce both FAR and FRR, but in practice they are often
negatively correlated. As discussed in the previous experiments, we use bit rate threshold to determine if a key
should be accepted. Therefore, here we vary the threshold (from 20 to 90) to see the correlation between FRR and
FAR (see the lines in Fig. 12(a)(b) and Fig. 12(a)(c), where each dot is corresponding to a bit rate threshold value).
We also vary the quantization factor K , and plot the FAR vs. FRR curves for K = {0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85}. As we
can see, the proposed system works best with K = 0.75 under passive and mimicking attacks, where both FAR
and FRR are lower (the curve is closer to the origin). We first investigate the results under mimicking attacks, in
this case the EER is 0.016 (see the rectangle marked in Fig. 12(a)), which is the best balance between FAR and
FRR.While for passive attacks, the EER is 0.0114 (see Fig. 12(b)) which is slightly lower than that under mimicking
attacks. As the system seems more vulnerable under mimicking attacks, we determine the parameters of our
system according to the results of mimicking attacks. In practice, we typically require a lower FAR to make the
system more conservative and robust against mimicking attacks, although this will increase the chances of falsely
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Fig. 12. FAR and FFR of the proposed system under different bit rate thresholds and quantization factor K under mimicking
attacks and passive attacks. The best EER can be achieved in our experiments is 0.016 for mimicking attacks and 0.0114 for
passive attacks (marked by the red rectangles).
rejected legitimate handshakes. Concretely, in the current implementation we set the quantization factor K to
0.75, and the bit rate threshold to 70 bits per second. As shown in Fig. 9(a), with these parameter settings the
system is able to generate a 128-bit key with only on average 1.3 seconds of handshaking, and we use device
vibration patterns to inform the users if the data exchange is successfully completed, or requires another go. It is
worth noted that 1.3 is longer than a normal handshake in social occasions; however, the users will benefit from
the security add-on with little extra effort when they need to exchange information using their smart watches.
5.2.4 Security Analysis on Eavesdropping Attacks. We then evaluate the performance of the proposed
system under eavesdropping attacks. We use the legitimate datasets and one adversary dataset (eavesdropping
dataset) to evaluate its performance. We vary the quantization factor to compute the corresponding generated bit
rate, bit agreement rate and signal coherence.
Generated Bits Rate v.s. K:We present how the generated bit rate of the legitimate handshakes and eavesdrop-
ping attacks varies over different K . It is apparent that the generated bit rate during eavesdropping attack is
identical to the legitimate handshakes. This is because the adversary only overhears the communication between
the legitimate devices but does not try to impersonate into the key generation protocol. The adversary determines
the valid positions of the bits according to the reconciliation message exchanged between the legitimate devices,
therefore, it produces the same bit rate to the legitimate handshakes.
Bit Agreement Rate v.s. K: Though in eavesdropping attacks, the adversary produces high bit rate, it is
impossible to decrypt the message without producing the identical key to the legitimate users. We compare the
bit agreement rate produced by the legitimate handshakes and eavesdropping attacks. It is worth noting that,
in eavesdropping attack experiment, the adversary is able to mimic the legitimate handshakes close by as this
produces higher agreement rate according to the evaluation in Section 5.2.3. The results of the bit agreement rate
are presented in Fig. 13(a). We can see that the average of the bit agreement rate produced by the adversaries
fluctuates with the growth ofK . The most important observation is that the gap between legitimate and adversarial
handshakes is always significant through all K and the agreement rate of the adversarial handshakes are unstable:
it produces large variance. This indicates the eavesdropping attacks are nearly impossible to be successful.
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Fig. 13. The (a) bit rate and (b) bit agreement rate generated by eavesdrop attacks benchmarked by legitimate handshakes
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Fig. 14. The signals coherence under eavesdropping attacks.
Signal Coherence: At last, we compare the coherence between a) signals produced by two legitimate devices and
b) signals produced by one legitimate device and the adversarial devices which was mimicking the handshakes in
eavesdropping attacks. Fig. 14 demonstrates the empirical CDFs of from eavesdropping attacks compared with
the legitimate handshakes. We can easily confirm again that it is difficult to mimic the handshakes real-time in
eavesdropping attacks as well.
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Table 1. Overhead of the proposed key generation system inters of running time (ms) and energy consumption (mJ).
Components Time Energy
Handshake Motion Capture 3.1 ms 2.04 mJ
SVM-based Handshake Detection 8.9 ms 5.86 mJ
Signal Feature Extraction 78.4 ms 60.35 mJ
Key Generation 89.6 ms 6.25 mJ
Total 180 ms 74.5 mJ
5.2.5 System Overhead. The final set of experiments evaluate the overhead of the proposed key generation
system when running on off-the-shelf smart wearables. We profile the running time and energy consumption
caused by key components of the system, including Handshake Motion Capture, SVM-based Handshake Detection,
Feature Extraction, and Key Generation. The overhead of rest components such as data encryption and decryption
can be application-specific, and is not considered in this paper. In our implementation, we use the very lightweight
Advanced Encryption Standard (ASE) for data encryption/decryption, which only incurs negligible overhead
according to our previous work [30].
Table 1 presents the detailed resource consumption of the three components obtained from Android APIs,
averaging from 30 independent tests. We can see that the total running time is only 180 ms, and thus we could
easily run the proposed system in real-time. On the other hand, the average extra energy consumed by the key
generation is 74.5 mJ. Since the system only works opportunistically when data exchange is required, its impact
on the battery life should be limited. In fact, the battery capacity of Samsung Gear Live used in our experiments
is 300 mAh (i.e., 4.32 kJ). If the targeted lifespan of the devices is one day (normally 12 hours of active usage), the
proposed key generation system only accounts for 0.02% of the hourly budget (360 J), which is marginal.
6 RELATED WORK
Wrist Worn Smart Wearables: The studies on smartwatches are booming in recent years and have produced
many novel applications to improve the well-being of human’s life. The sensor readings, e.g., accelerometer and
gyroscope of the smartwatches can easily track the motion of user’s arm therefore are often used in activities
recognition. For examples, in [23], the authors proposed to use smartwatches to detect if the wearers took a
foosball break at workplace to maintain the work-break balance of the workers. Moreover, smartwatches were
used to detect activities of the drivers in [13] to ensure the safety of the wearer during drive and they could be
also used to recognize the text inputs [2]. To improve the accuracy of activities recognition on smartwatches, the
authors in [3] sought the power of deep learning techniques. Besides of activities recognition, there is also some
work concerning the security issue related to smartwatches. For examples, the sensors on the mobile devices can
be utilized as the sources of generating random numbers which are key components for a number of different
security-related applications [28]. In [33] the authors proposed, Gait-watch, an authentication system exploiting
the unique gait information of the smartwatch users to automatically detect the real user or malicious intruders.
SecureWireless Communication Between Smart Devices: A secure communication channel establishment
between smart mobile devices requires multiple parties encryption key generation. Key generation methods are
mainly based on the common information between the two parties sharing data. One of the mainstream studies
focus on the properties of the wireless communication. For example, the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
of the wireless channel are frequently used to produce shared keys [9, 11, 19–21, 26] as the RSSI at the both ends
should be the same. However the RSSI-based methods are only suitable for wireless devices exchanging packages
frequently but the application scenarios of the proposed system are for once-off data sharing. Another mainstream
of key generation for mobile devices is utilizing the accelerometer readings. For examples, in [4, 5, 14], the authors
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proposed to hold two mobile devices in one hand and shake them together; therefore the accelerometer reading
could be used to generate agreed keys. However, as our previous discussion in Section 1, these methods are not
applicable for smartwatches belonging to different users. The previous work in [30] addressed the problem of
automatic key generation for paring the on-body sensor networks by utilizing another natural pattern of human,
i.e., gaits. It focused on the mobile devices worn on the same human’s body; therefore, it cannot be extended to
this work. However, it is worth noting that we adopt the common quantization and key reconciliation mechanism
proposed in previous work, however we solve significantly different problems.
Data Exchange Between Smart Wearables: Finally, there is some work exploring data sharing between
smartwatches or waistbands. For examples, the Nabu Smartband is able to share users social contacts via
handshake; Apple Inc. drafted a patent [22] about exchanging information between devices in proximity when
detecting a “greeting event” including handshakes. However, In both of these approaches, handshakes were
just regarded as a hint to inform the devices there was a data sharing request, it did not consider to use these
handshakes to secure their data sharing process which was the major contribution of this paper. Besides, In a
patent [1] submitted by Microsoft Inc., they proposed a new waist-worn hardware which was able to transfer
data via human body therefore the secure data sharing could be achieved by physical contacts like handshakes.
However, it required extra hardware and could not be adopted by the majority of currently available smart
wearables.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the design and implementation of a novel key generation system which enables secure
data exchange between smart devices via handshakes. The proposed system further blurs the boundaries between
the physical and cyber worlds, as it uses the physical contact i.e., handshakes between users, to bridge cyber
contact, such as friending on social networks. Under the hood, our system uses the wrist worn smart wearables,
such as smartwatches or fitness bands, to capture the motion patterns induced by handshakes. We show although
belonged to different users, that the motion signals of the two hands shaking together are very similar. Based on
this, we propose novel approaches to robustly generate and reconcile cryptographic keys on both sides, and use
the pair of symmetric keys to establish secure wireless communication channel in a distributed way. We evaluate
the proposed key generation system extensively in real-world settings, and experimental results show that the
proposed system: a) is able to reliably generate high quality keys within less than two seconds of handshaking; b)
is very resilient to the mimicking attacks, achieving only 1.6% Equal Error Rate; and c) can run in real-time on
off-the-shelf smartwatches with very slim resource consumption.
The key quantization component in this paper only considers binary quantization which limits the key
generation rate. Therefore, users need to pay more efforts on handshaking compared with normal occasions. In
the future, we will investigate multi-level quantization strategy to significantly improve the key generation rate
so that the key can be generated with significantly shorter handshakes.
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